आई एस आई ने बनायी भारत को बांटने की साजिश

(अक्टूबर तक १० हजार करोड़ के जाली नोट बाजार में आने की आशंका, नवंबर में हो सकता है भारत पर हमला
पाक खुफिया एजेंसी ने नेपाल में अपना अड्डा बनाया, भारत से हमदर्दी के कारण शेख हसीना की हो सकती है हत्या, माओवादी आतंकवाद और जोर पकड़ सकता है)
हरिराम पाण्डेय
कोलकाता : पाकिस्तान की कुख्यात खुफिया एजेंसी आई एस आई ने भारत के खिलाफ कई खतरनाक साजिशों को जल्दी ही अंजाम देने फैसला किया है।
'ऑपरेशन गजनी ०९' के नाम की इस साजिश के पांच हिस्से हैं। पहला है नवंबर तक भारत पर कारगिल सरीखा एक और हमला, दूसरा बंगलादेश से अड्डा हटा कर नेपाल में स्थापित करने का फैसला, तीसरा भारत का समर्थन करने वाली बंगलादेश की प्रधानमंत्री शेख हसीना वाजिद की हत्या, चौथा भारत में जाली नोटों की बाढ़ लाकर अर्थव्यवस्था का सत्यानाश करना और पांचवां माओवादियों को भारत के भीतर सी आर जेड (कॉमपैक्ट रिवोल्यूशनरी जोन) मुहैय्या कराना।
गत १७ अगस्त २००९ को पश्चिमी चीन के सिंकियांग स्वायात्तशासी प्रांत के सेरम झील के समीप एक विशाल इमारत में चली चार दिवसीय बैठक में इस ऑपरेशन को अंतिम रूप दिया गया। भारतीय उच्चपदस्थ सूत्रों के मुताबिक इस बैठक में चीनी फौज की खुफिया इकाई और आई एस आई के २५-३० सदस्यों ने भाग लिया था। पाकिस्तानी दल के मुखिया थे खालिद महमूद और उनके सहयोगी थे जमील आलम। यहां यह बता देना उचित होगा कि खालिद कुछ दिन पहले तक काठमांडू में पाकिस्तानी दूतावास में शिक्षा कौंसुल के कवर में काम कर रहे थे और राजशाही का तख्ता पलटने में उनकी बड़ी भूमिका थी।
इस बैठक के बारे में भारतीय खुफिया सूत्रों को मिली जानकारी के अनुसार जाली भारतीय नोट छापने की मशीनें जो बिराट नगर और ढाका में लगी थीं, उन्हें फिलहाल बंद कर दिया गया है और छपे हुए जाली नोट चीनी कब्जे वाले हांगकांग, दुबई तथा खाड़ी के कुछ अन्य देशों से पाकिस्तान राजनयिक असबाब में काठमांडू लाया जा रहा है। काठमांडू से माओवादियों की देखरेख में उन नोटों को बीरगंज से लगभग २० किमी दूर सिरिसिया लाया जाता है। वहां इन नोटों का गोदाम है और वहां से उन्हें भारत के विभिन्न शहरों में पहुंचाया जाता है। यह सारी कार्रवाई इस बार भारतीय माओवादियों के सहयोग से हो रही है।
चूंकि माओवादियों को अपने आंदोलन के लिये धन की जरूरत है और आई एस आई को भारत में आतंकवादी गतिविधियों को चलाने के लिये धन की जरूरत है इसलिये इस धंधे में हाथ मिला कर दोनों एक दूसरे के पूरक बन गये हैं। आश्चर्य की बात तो यह है कि दुनिया में बीरगंज के समीप मटियरवा सीमा चौकी एक ऐसी जगह है, जहां समीप ही जाली भारतीय नोटों का बाजार लगता है। सब्जियों की तरह टोकरियों में ५००- १००० रुपयों के नोटों की गड्डियां भर कर कतार से दुकानें सजती हैं। नेपाली रुपयों के बराबर मूल्य पर या भारतीय मुद्रा में ५० प्रतिशत दाम पर रुपये बिकते हैं। यहां से सायकिल से कुछ ही मिनटों में भारतीय सीमा में दाखिल हुआ जा सकता है।
जाली नोट भी कुछ ऐसे कि एक दम पारखी आंखें भी धोखा खा जाएं। दरअसल, असली की तरह दिखने वाले ये नोट उन्हीं कागजों पर छपते हैं, जिन पर भारतीय रिजर्व बैंक अपने नोट छापता है। अभी हाल ही में ब्रिटिश खुफिया संगठन एम आई ५ ने भारत सरकार को आगाह किया था कि एक पाकिस्तानी व्यापारी जमील आलम ने सैकड़ों रीम वही कागज खरीदा है, जिस पर भारतीय बड़े नोट छपते हैं और समुद्र के रास्ते 'गोल्ड स्टार' नाम के पाकिस्तानी जलपोत से १५ जून को दुबई भेजा गया। खुफिया सूत्रों के मुताबिक इस कागज से हजार और ५ सौ रुपयों के ३ हजार करोड़ के नोट छापे जा चुके हैं। केंद्र सरकार को जैसे ही यह खबर मिली सबके होश उड़ गये। प्रधानमंत्री ने राष्ट्र को सचेत किया कि आतंकी फिर कार्रवाई की तैयारी में हैं। अभी हाल में नेपाल के प्रधानमंत्री माधव कुमार नेपाल और विदेश मंत्री सुजाता कोइराला को दिल्ली आमंत्रित किया गया था। सरकार ने जाली नोटों की बाढ़ रोकने पर विचार विमर्श किया तथा व्यापार समझौते में संशोधन का आश्वासन भी दिया। नेपाल में माओवादियों का वर्चस्व भारत के लिये सिरदर्द है।
सूत्रों के अनुसार आई एस आई ने अक्टूबर के आखिर तक बीरगंज सीमा से १० हजार करोड़ के जाली नोट भारतीय बाजार में डाल देने की योजना बनायी है। अगर उसकी यह साजिश कामयाब होती है तो १९५ जिलों में सूखे और भारी महंगाई को देखते हुये सहज ही अनुमान लगाया जा सकता है कि क्या होगा।
इसके बाद उनकी साजिश के दूसरे भाग की शुरूआत की जायेगी। जिसके अंतर्गत भारत पर कारगिल सरीखा इक हमला किया जा सकता है। यह हमला इस बार जम्मू या राजस्थान की सीमा पर कहीं से हो सकता है। महंगाई और सूखा त्रस्त भारत पर यह हमला अर्थव्यवस्था को चरमरा कर रख देगा और तब भीतर से फूटेगा माओवादी आतंकवाद। जबसे सरकार को इसकी सूचना मिली है सरकार के होश उड़े हुए हैं तथा राजनयिक स्तर पर पाकिस्तान पर दबाव बनाने की कोशिश चल रही है।
(लेखक दैनिक समाचार पत्र के संपादक हैं)

The inflation monster

The incumbent regime is jittery. Accusations and counter-accusations are being hurled by important ministers in the government against one another. Within the Congress party, which leads the ruling United Progressive Alliance coalition, a blame game has begun. Who is to be held responsible? Fingers are being pointed at Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Finance Minister Palaniappan Chidambaram. And the reason is obvious. Prices of food products have been rising at a pace that is politically rather too uncomfortable in an election year. The monster of inflation threatens to gobble up all the gains claimed by the UPA government over the nearly-four years it has been in power.

That inflation could go out of hand was feared by many. Still, those in government were keeping their fingers crossed hoping that the situation would not go out of hand. But it has. Not only have food prices risen at an alarmingly fast pace, there is apprehension that the inflation rate may pick up further if the monsoon is not favourable. If Indra Bhagwan, the god of rainfall, does not smile on the country, hyper-inflation cannot be ruled out. That may or may not happen, but the position is pretty bad in any case.

At a media conference on March 31, Congress party spokesperson Veerappa Moily reeled of statistics on inflation in other countries. He pointed out that the inflation rate was around 8.4 per cent in China at present against barely 2 per cent recently. Moily wanted to underscore the point that inflation, especially the rise in prices of food products, was a global phenomenon and not confined to India alone. He did not, of course, mention that there have occasions not very long ago when the annual rate of inflation in countries like Brazil, Argentina, Russia and Israel have ruled at triple digits.

Nor did Moily choose to point out that according to the government of Zimbabwe, the annual inflation rate in 2007 was in the region of 16,000 per cent! In other words, prices had jumped 160 times in that African country bringing it back to an era of barter exchange, somewhat reminiscent of what had happened in the Weimar Republic in Germany in the 1930s. These examples mean nothing to the person on the street, the proverbial aam admi. The home-maker knows how her budget has been squeezed and she certainly does not go by the figures put out by the Indian government, which releases data on the wholesale price index every Friday. (See accompanying story on why official price indices do not reflect the reality on the ground.)

World food prices have never been as high as they are currently, making the import option rather expensive. Thus, even if foreign exchange reserves with the Reserve Bank of India are at a record level in excess of US $ 280 billion, the problem that has been witnessed over the last two years continues, namely, world food prices shoot up as soon as India announces its intention to buy. This has been particularly true in the case of wheat. We, therefore, have a piquant situation in which the government of India pays farmers a minimum support price of, say, Rs 1,100 for a quintal (100 kilograms) of wheat and also ends of importing inferior quality wheat from a country like Australia at a landed price that is higher by Rs 600-800 a quintal.

An important challenge before Union Minister Sharad Pawar has been his ability to balance the interests of farmers and consumers. After all, he is both Minister for Agriculture as well as Minister for Consumer Affairs. This particular balancing act is not an easy task at the best of times – it is tougher than managing cricket in the country. Sugarcane farmers in Maharashtra may be grateful to the Pawar and the government for the loan waiver scheme. But the rest of India may not be as appreciative. The bigwig of the Nationalist Congress Party is one of the ministers who has been attacked for allegedly mismanaging food supplies, even though he has staunchly justified his actions at Cabinet meetings.

Many believe that the haphazard way in which the country has exported food products (in particular, dal, and also rice and wheat to an extent) over the recent past, has been less than prudent. One example would suffice: in the course of calendar 2006, exports of onions surged by over 60 per cent while retail prices at home shot up by around 150 per cent. Successive governments at the Centre and in the states have also not been able to improve the working of the public distribution system in many parts of the country.

The country’s total wheat stocks came down to 2.01 million tonnes in April 2006 from a peak of 41.1 million tonnes in July 2002 (against a buffer norm of 15 million tonnes). Between January 1, 2007 and New Year’s Day this year, wheat stocks had risen from 5.42 million tonnes to 7.71 million tonnes – that are still well below the buffer norm. Six years ago, Nobel laureate Amartya Sen and his collaborator Jean Dreze had pointed out that if all the bags of wheat and rice with the Food Corporation of India were placed end to end, the row of bags of foodgrain would go all the way to the moon and back!

Managing food supplies, calibrating exports and imports and coordinating the activities of at least three important ministries – Agriculture, Commerce and Finance – has not been the government’s only headache in controlling inflationary expectations. The problem in India has been compounded by the skyrocketing international prices of crude oil over which the government has had no control.
Who recalls that when American troops entered Baghdad in March 2003, the price of oil was less than $ 25 a barrel? These prices have since more than quadrupled. The demand for petroleum products in India is growing at least as fast as the speed with which the country’s gross domestic product is expanding, that is, 8-9 per cent per year, if not faster. Because domestic output of crude oil is hardly going up, the country has become, and is increasingly becoming, dependent on imports. India is currently importing three-quarters of its total requirements of crude oil, roughly two-thirds of it from the Middle East (even if supplies are contracted from different parts of the world).
A combination of two broad sets of factors – described by economists as ‘demand-pull’ and ‘cost-push’ factors – contribute to inflation. Till the end of August 2006, inflation was largely cost-push and driven by high oil prices. International prices of crude oil had crashed from over $75 a barrel in early-August to just over $ 50 a barrel by December that year, before going up. During this period, domestic retail prices of petrol and diesel did not go down commensurately. The government wanted to protect its tax revenues and the bottomlines of oil companies. Prices came down much later and only by a small proportion.

Given the present political reality, the government will not be able to again increase the prices of petrol and diesel. Even the modest hike in diesel prices has jacked up transportation costs. In turn, this brings about a more-than-proportionate, across-the-board hike in the retail prices of a host of products of mass consumption, especially food items.

Roughly half the consumer price of both petrol and diesel goes to government coffers. In the budget, Chidambaram changed the structure of excise duties on petrol and diesel by making these specific (that is, the tax is levied on the basis of quantity and not value). However, customs duties remain ad valorem and add to the government’s revenues when import prices go up. North Block is clearly reluctant to give up this source of money on the ground that these funds are needed for the government’s various social welfare schemes. Rather belatedly, the Finance Ministry agreed to cut customs duties on imported crude oil.

An increase in the subsidized prices of kerosene and cooking gas seems most unlikely. Since the government will not risk taking politically ‘hard’ decisions at this juncture, it will issue more bonds to oil refining and marketing companies (like Indian Oil Corporation, Hindustan Petroleum corporation and Bharat Petroleum Corporation) to compensate them partially for what are euphemistically described as ‘under-recoveries’. In the current fiscal year, till the end of February, the government had issued securities worth Rs 1,257 crore to oil companies in lieu of subsidies. India had been cushioned from the worst ravages of the increase in world prices of crude oil because of the recent appreciation in the value of the Indian currency in relation to the US dollar, but even this bit of comfort has disappeared.

Oil prices in international markets show no signs of significantly abating at the time of writing, although at least one reputed international organization (the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific) has gone on record saying it expects oil prices to fall on account of the slowdown in the US economy. The price of the average basket of crude oil imported by India has crossed the $ 100 a barrel mark.

Even if world oil prices come down, it seems unlikely that food prices will. The planet’s energy security and its food security are getting increasingly interlinked as more wheat, maize and soyabean get diverted for the production of biofuels.

If there is one economic phenomenon that affects the lives of everybody and makes politicians in particular very scared about their future, it is inflation. What is worse for India’s rulers at present is the simple fact that inflation has been largely driven by high food prices. Economists point out that inflation is like a tax on the poor -- it results in an indirect transfer of resources from the poor to the rich. Inflation shrinks the real incomes of the underprivileged while the incomes and profits of the affluent rise. When inflation is driven by high food prices, it becomes a double tax on the poor because the poor spend a relatively much higher proportion of their total incomes on food unlike the rich.

Faced with rapid erosion in its popularity, the government is fighting with its back to the wall in trying to control the rise in prices. The problem with both fiscal and monetary measures is that none of these offer instant, quick-fix solutions. The problem of inflation is structural and systemic – it did not occur suddenly, not will it disappear overnight. Many critics of the ruling regime argue that the measures that are currently being taken to control inflation should have been initiated at least two years ago to prevent ‘overheating’ in the economy.

In its desire to crow about the high rates of growth of the economy, the government in general and the Finance Ministry in particular went slow in suggesting to the RBI that the cash reserve ratio of banks be stepped up (thereby reducing money supply). Chidambaram was also hesitant about hardening interest rates because such a move was opposed by corporate captains on the ground that it would slow down industrial growth and the expansion of housing and construction. Today, the FM has no choice but to sing a different tune. He now says the government is willing to sacrifice growth in order to keep prices in check.

Chidambaram has clearly had to succumb to pressure exerted on him by the ‘left’ faction within the Congress, which has opposed the ‘neo-liberal’ and ‘market-friendly’ economic policy stance favoured by him and the PM. The ‘left’ wing has exerted considerable pressure on party president Sonia Gandhi and told her that many of the government’s economic policy positions will prove to be politically disastrous. It is contended by this section that the poor vote in large numbers – unlike the wealthy sections. This group rues that the government has woken up to this aspect of the Indian reality rather late in the day when elections are round the corner.

It may be fine to announce a Rs 60,000-crore farm loan waiver scheme and shout about it to the rest of the world. But controlling prices poses far tougher challenges. The poor does not care if India’s gross domestic product has grown by more than 9 per cent two years in succession for the first time in sixty years. For them, the prices of wheat, rice, dal and sabzi matter.

Over the last year and longer, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has time and again said that curbing the rise in the prices of essential food products is topmost on the list of the government’s priorities. The question, therefore, is why the government has apparently failed in this crucial task? By arguing that inflation is a global phenomenon, the government may not be able to convince ordinary people to vote for the ruling dispensation.

In the first press conference he addressed as Finance Minister in the P.V. Narasimha Rao government in June 1991, Manmohan Singh had questioned the feasibility of implementing Rajiv Gandhi’s pre-election promise to roll back prices of various products if his party was returned to power. Congress party netas were livid at what the learned economist and technocrat had naively remarked. He perhaps knew, better than most others, how difficult it is to bring prices down.
Manmohan Singh has presumably become more politically savvy today compared to sixteen years ago when he had to eat his words. His government is trying its level best to douse the inflationary fires that are burning. But is it an instance of ‘too little, too late’?

The challenge of terrorism

S. KALYANARAMAN


ON 23 December 1929, a bomb planted by Indian revolutionaries exploded under the Viceroy’s special train but without causing any serious injury to Lord Irwin. At the Lahore session of the Indian National Congress held the very next week, Mahatma Gandhi pushed through a resolution ‘condemning the cowardly deed of the misguided youth.’ Though he urged that the resolution be passed unanimously, a reluctant Congress did so by a thin majority of 81 in a house numbering 1713. Subsequently, Gandhi wrote an article in Young India titled ‘The Cult of the Bomb’, in which he dismissed bomb-throwing as nothing but ‘froth coming to the surface in an agitated liquid.’ At the same time, he warned that it is an ‘easy, natural step’ from violence done to the foreign ruler ‘to violence to our own people whom we may consider to be obstructing the country’s progress.’

To rebut Gandhi’s condemnation, Bhagawati Charan, in consultation with Chandra Shekhar Azad, drafted a manifesto in 1930 titled ‘The Philosophy of the Bomb’. Terrorism, the manifesto asserted, is a ‘necessary’ and ‘inevitable’ phase of the revolution. ‘Terrorism instils fear in the hearts of the oppressors, it brings hopes of revenge and redemption to the oppressed masses, it gives courage and self-confidence to the wavering, it shatters the spell of the superiority of the ruling class and raises the status of the subject race in the eyes of the world, because it is the most convincing proof of a nation’s hunger for freedom.’ The manifesto went on to note that it is reason and conscience which force the revolutionary to ‘risk his life’. And it concluded by proclaiming that the revolutionaries will take ‘a people’s righteous revenge on the tyrant’ and that theirs is ‘a war to the end – to victory or death.’



This episode is indicative of the divide that exists between the idea that terrorists are freedom fighters and martyrs, the characterisation of terrorist attacks as cowardly and dastardly, and the in-between view that while terrorism is indeed unjustifiable, the genuine grievances that drive terrorists cannot also be overlooked. In addition, the debate on terrorism has also thrown up the question of ‘state terrorism’. After all, the origins of the modern usage of the word terrorism lie in the ‘state terror’ unleashed by the French revolutionary regime to intimidate those opposed to the revolution or otherwise sympathetic to or nostalgic about the ancien régime. Moreover, states also deliberately target civilians and non-combatants in the course of wars and internal conflicts.

Are we to therefore simply conclude that terrorism is a relative term best defined as ‘violence that I don’t support?’ To chart a path through the minefield that is the debate on defining terrorism and how to address this phenomenon, one approach is to look at terrorism as a strategy, a means to achieve an objective. A strategy adopted by a political group in which civilians and non-combatants are deliberately targeted to generate terror as well as to highlight the cause. The objective is to undermine the foundations of the state, its legitimacy, and its ability to command the people’s compliance. Terrorist actions are conceived as either ends in themselves or designed to be precursors to a mass uprising. Terrorism is thus a subset of political violence.



Terrorism, however, needs to be distinguished from other forms of political violence employed by armed rebel groups. This is particularly the case with guerrilla warfare (or insurgency) with which terrorism is often confused and conflated. True, guerrilla warfare, like terrorism, is a weapon of the weak, employed precisely because weakness precludes a rebel group from engaging in regular war against organised state forces. Notwithstanding this surface similarity, the two strategies proceed along very different paths. Guerrillas (or insurgents) primarily target state forces, mobilise people and acquire popular support, establish a parallel government in ‘liberated zones’, and over time seek to expand control over surrounding territories and transform their ragtag forces into a regular army. Guerrillas, in Mao’s famous formulation, are the fish and people the water.

In contrast, the people have become the target of terrorist violence, especially since the 1970s. Gandhi’s prophetic words about the ‘easy, natural step’ from violence done to the oppressor to violence inflicted on non-cooperative or unresponsive compatriots, have indeed become a reality. The deliberate targeting of innocent civilians is a hallmark particularly of the contemporary avatar of terrorism. This was not the case in the historical practice of terrorism, which largely involved targeting the symbols of political authority – heads of state, viceroys and proconsuls, ministers, civilian and military officials, leading political figures, among others. These attacks were intended as ‘propaganda by deed’ in an era when terrorism was considered the ultima ratio, the final resort. But the ‘new’ terrorism does not discriminate in its choice of victims and its motto is, ‘there are no innocents.’

Further, while the earlier practice of terrorism was largely directed against tyrannical or despotic regimes and colonial or imperial authorities, democracies have emerged as principal targets of the contemporary exercise in terrorism. Thus, from ultima ratio terrorism seems to be becoming the prima ratio of political protest. Another significant difference between ‘old’ and ‘new’ terrorism is state support for and sponsorship of terrorist groups. While the earlier breed of terrorists by and large operated on their own, the employment of terrorism as an instrument of statecraft (a cost-effective means of destabilising adversaries) is a key feature of latter-day terrorism. Terrorism has acquired a pejorative connotation over the last few decades precisely because of these changes.



There have been various hues of armed rebellion in India since independence. Telangana and Naxalbari were insurrections. The Maoist groups operating across many states are engaged in a classic insurgency. Most armed political groups in the North East also began as separatist or autonomist insurgencies. But, over the years, some have become mere extortion rackets, while others like the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) in particular have taken to terrorism. Terrorism, the deliberate targeting of civilians, was first practised by separatist groups in Punjab. In the 1990s, this practice also became prevalent as part of the separatist struggle in Jammu and Kashmir. The involvement of Pakistani and transnational groups in the so-called jihad in Kashmir has contributed to the further expansion of the terror campaign to the hinterland.



The most significant terrorist group in the North East today is ULFA. Founded in 1979 with the aim of establishing a ‘sovereign socialist Assam through armed struggle’, it built up its armed strength and ran a parallel government in Assam in the latter half of the 1980s. When it initiated armed action in the 1990s, targets were limited to the security forces, railway lines, the oil pipeline, and political opponents. However, after the group was expelled from Bhutan in 2003 and it relocated its base areas in Bangladesh, ULFA has initiated a terror campaign inside Assam. Most targets struck since then have been civilian.

The August 2004 bombing in Dhemaji town, which killed 17 people, mostly children, has come to be seen as the turning point in this regard. 73 bomb explosions were triggered in 2005, 59 in 2006, 54 in 2007, and 10 in 2008 – all in public places. ULFA has also been targeting Hindi-speaking migrant labourers over the last couple of years. Its turn towards terrorism seems to have coincided with its linkages and dependence upon the intelligence agencies of Bangladesh and Pakistan. The support it receives includes arms training, safe havens, funds and weaponry. ULFA is also known to have links with the Bangladeshi jihadi group, Harkat-ul-Jehadi-e-Islami.



In Punjab, competitive politics led to the emergence of a religious extremist like Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale as a key figure. Inspired by the vision of leading the Sikhs to ‘ultimate purity’ and an independent Khalistan, Bhindranwale started an incipient campaign of violence against his political opponents in the early 1980s. But a full-blown terrorist movement emerged only in the aftermath of Operation Bluestar, the consequent assassination of Indira Gandhi and the anti-Sikh riots that followed. The terror campaign unleashed by the various groups was indiscriminate in nature and saw the killing of political leaders, officials, journalists, businessmen, and the common people at large, both Sikh and Hindu.

K.P.S. Gill notes that in the peak years of 1990 and 1991, 1702 and 1851 Sikhs, respectively, were killed by the terrorists. The number of non-Sikhs killed in these two years was 765 and 740. One of the worst massacres was the mid-air bombing of the Kanishka in 1985, killing all passengers and crew on board. Bombs were also placed in public transport in Punjab, Haryana, Delhi and Jammu and Kashmir. In all, 11,500 civilians were killed in Punjab between 1981 when the terrorist violence first manifested itself and 1993 when the back of the terrorist movement was broken. About 1750 security forces personnel also died during the same period. A significant factor in the greater intensity of violence was Pakistan’s provision of sophisticated weaponry and explosives as well as training to the terrorist groups.



Punjab, in many ways, was a training ground for Pakistan’s sponsorship of cross-border terrorism against India in Jammu and Kashmir. An armed separatist movement arose in the state in the wake of the fraudulent elections of 1987. Some 20,000 youth crossed the border into Pakistan for military training by the mid-1990s. The pro-independence Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front stood at the forefront of this movement in the initial years. But Pakistan threw its weight behind the Hizbul Mujahideen, which favoured Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan. When India gained the upper hand against the separatists in the next few years, Pakistan began to funnel its own citizens and other ‘graduates of the Afghan war’ into Jammu and Kashmir.

With groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba, Harkat-ul-Ansar, and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen assuming a greater role, what was hitherto an internal rebellion, albeit with considerable support from Pakistan, degenerated into cross-border terrorism. Mass killings, especially of minorities, began with the introduction of transnational jihadists. Neither have they spared Kashmiri Muslims, in whose name they wage their so-called jihad. Overall, between 1988 when the violence first began and 2008, some 14,500 civilians have been killed in terrorist violence in the state. In addition, more than 5,800 security forces personnel have also lost their lives during this period.

Involving foreign jihadists has provided a lever for Pakistan to scuttle any movement towards peace in the state, as demonstrated during the short-lived Ramzan ceasefire between Indian security forces and the Hizbul Mujahideen in the year 2000. When Pakistan’s Kargil misadventure failed to revive the flagging interest for the struggle within the state and in the world at large, transnational groups began to engage in fidayeen attacks against security forces. Subsequently, this campaign was extended to other parts of India as well. The first target to be attacked was the Red Fort in Delhi in December 2000. A year later, it was the turn of the Indian Parliament. India’s threat of war against this grave provocation, combined with international condemnation and pressure, forced Pakistan to lower the intensity of operations being carried out by terrorist groups based on its territory. But even as infiltration from Pakistan into Jammu and Kashmir showed a decline in the succeeding years, a terror campaign targeting India’s hinterland began to unfold.



Links between Indian citizens engaged in this new wave of urban terrorism and their friends, if not masters, in Pakistan are gradually unravelling. The shameful tragedy of Gujarat 2002 and the earlier demolition of the Babri Masjid served as catalysts for a handful of youth to travel to Pakistan, acquire training in arms, and forge links with the Establishment as well as transnational groups there. These men have come together under the banner of Indian Mujahideen. The group is a diffuse network spread across several states. Its aim appears to include causing maximum casualties and mayhem by targeting places where people congregate, arousing communal passions by targeting mosques and temples, and disrupting the economy by targeting important sectors like tourism and information technology.

Thus, seven bombs were placed on Mumbai suburban trains in July 2006, killing 209 people and injuring over 700; the Sankatmochan Temple in Varanasi was bombed in March 2006 and the Mecca Masjid in Hyderabad in May 2007; and, Jaipur and Bengaluru were targeted in May and July 2008, respectively. According to the email claiming responsibility for the multiple bomb blasts in the markets of Delhi in September 2008, the group’s aim was to ‘stop the heart of India from beating.’ Other places that have been targeted as part of this terror campaign include Ahmedabad, Faizabad, Hyderabad, Lucknow, Surat and Varanasi.

A significant feature of the Indian Mujahideen’s tactics is the use of the widely available fertilizer ammonium nitrate as explosive. The group has also demonstrated its coordination capabilities by carrying out serial bomb blasts on successive days in more than one place – the July 2008 attacks in Bengaluru, Ahmedabad and the bombs that failed to detonate in Surat. Their use of email to claim responsibility, the manner in which emails were sent from hacked wi-fi connections, and the ability to vary the intensity of the explosions in Bengaluru and Ahmedabad, all point to the group’s technological capabilities.



Even as Indian agencies were attempting to piece together the Indian Mujahideen puzzle, 10 well-armed and well-trained Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists landed in Mumbai and launched a commando-style operation against the maximum city’s symbols. 164 people and security forces personnel died in this assault, including 26 foreign nationals. The trail led to Pakistani territory and Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorist commanders and many in India suspected the role of elements within the Pakistani establishment. The reasoning was that the attack was meant to divert the incoming Obama administration’s central focus from the Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier towards the India-Pakistan border.

Coincidentally, unidentified militants in Pakistan targeted American and NATO military supplies meant for their war efforts in Afghanistan, seemingly to remind the West about its vulnerabilities. It is not clear what kind of a grand bargain was being hinted at. But the Machiavellian strategy came to nought because of the restraint shown by India in the face of such an enormous provocation. However, Pakistan’s conviction that terrorist groups serve as ‘strategic assets’ in its foreign policy repertoire is likely to continue, notwithstanding ongoing American efforts to force a change in thinking.



Each of the above challenges necessitates a distinct policy approach. Separatist groups have to be dealt with through a policy of political accommodation and concessions backed by counter-insurgency and counter-terror measures. In the case of Pakistan-based terrorist groups, domestic counter-terror measures have to be accompanied by diplomatic and covert intelligence campaigns to disrupt and dismantle the terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan. And dealing with domestic urban terror groups would involve counter-terror measures, including the strengthening of laws, police and intelligence efforts to trace and neutralise terrorist cells and leadership, and mobilising communities and the people at large against subversives living in our midst.

India’s counterinsurgency strategy has been dealt with elsewhere in these pages. Suffice it to note here that since the 1950s India has followed a consistent and successful policy of using minimum force to deal with separatist groups and bringing them into the political mainstream through accommodation and concessions. While this approach is likely to prove useful in dealing with ULFA in Assam, it is inadequate for dealing with the situation in Jammu and Kashmir where the principal indigenous group, the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, has become inextricably intertwined with Pakistani and transnational terrorist groups under the umbrella of the United Jihad Council.

Any attempt by the Hizb to seek a separate peace is likely to result in the whittling down of Pakistani support (as happened in the case of the JKLF) and consequent marginalisation and irrelevance. Under the circumstances, the security efforts in Jammu and Kashmir need to be supplemented by measures to force Pakistan to cease support for terrorist groups targeting India as well as measures to disrupt and dismantle the terrorist infrastructure in that country.



At the diplomatic level India’s leverage vis-a-vis Pakistan is limited, especially at this juncture when the state of affairs in that country is delicately poised and when more powerful actors are engaged in attempting to save it from itself. All that can be done at the diplomatic level is to continually highlight Pakistan’s continuing use of terrorism as an instrument of policy and sustain international pressure to force Islamabad to take meaningful action against terrorist groups targeting India. At the same time, military measures aimed at either coercing the Pakistani establishment or disrupting the infrastructure of the terrorist groups would also be ill-advised. As seen during the crises of 2002, military coercion of the Pakistan government on one hand and leveraging military tensions for international diplomatic support on the other can yield only limited dividends.

It was also realised at that time that military strikes against terrorist camps would have only limited impact on the terror infrastructure. Moreover, military action would aggravate bilateral tensions, strengthen hawkish elements, and generally provide Pakistan an excuse for not taking action against terrorist groups which it continues to perceive as ‘strategic assets’. Instead of overt military strikes, India should adopt covert measures to both raise the cost to Islamabad as well as to degrade the terrorist leadership and infrastructure on Pakistani territory. A good example in this regard was India’s response in the late 1980s to the support Pakistan provided for Khalistan groups.



At the same time, India also needs to focus on domestic counter-terror measures, which have indeed received a fillip in the wake of the Mumbai attack. The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act has been legislated to provide the legal framework for counter-terrorism, and the National Investigation Agency has been established to investigate and prosecute terrorist offences. In addition, a number of measures have been taken to raise ‘the level of preparedness’ and enhance ‘the speed and decisiveness’ in responding to terrorist attacks or threats. These include a fresh mandate to the Multi Agency Centre and its subsidiaries to smoothen the collation and sharing of intelligence, and the establishment of National Security Guard hubs in different parts of the country to enable a quicker response to terrorist attacks.

However useful these institutions and mechanisms prove to be in the coming years, the key to counter-terrorism is the police force which falls within the purview of state governments. Until such time state governments shed their apathy and begin to appreciate the imperative of modernising and de-politicising their police forces, India’s counter-terrorism efforts are likely to remain ineffective

'Educating Sita' no easy feat in India

Sita does not go to school. This pithy, axiomatic sentence - perhaps born out of someone's smart idea that the British title Educating Rita could be profitably nativized - is a common refrain in India, often resorted to by experts who throw dismal statistics at the self-obsessed chattering classes in India as a shock tactic.
Well, despite their sustained exertions, it has taken India's executive and chief legislature six decades of independence to make free education for school-going children the law. The ball, first set rolling by a Supreme Court ruling that elementary education must be made a fundamental right, took 16 years to reach the goal.
After parliament passed the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education bill, parents across the country, whether rustic or urbane, poor or wealthy, backward or forward, will have to send Sita and her brother - basically, all children between the ages six and 14 - to school without fail. Otherwise, it would be treated as a violation of law. Of course, Sita will first have to be born, crossing the primary hurdle of female foeticide, before making her way to school. But that's another long story.
Needless to say, it is not merely parental reluctance - which, where it does exist, stems from the need to have extra pairs of hand at work - that keeps poor children away from school. Scores of people are theoretically poised on the verge of flouting the law only because there may be nothing that can fall within an acceptable definition of a school within miles of their habitat. It is a common enough deprivation in India.
Hence the state, too, has its role demarcated. The bill places the onus of providing certifiable infrastructure to support free education squarely on the state's shoulders. As for the school itself, whether privately run or government-funded/sponsored, the bill mandates that it will have to reserve 25% of its seats for students from the economically backward sections of the population at scholarship rates.
This has created a little storm in the teacup, with one section of the education sector shouting from the rooftops that there would be the inevitable problems of integration (between the rich and poor kids bundled together) and this by itself carries the potential for social tension. Others blame the government for having first come up woefully short in universalizing access to quality education infrastructure and then passing the burden of free education onto the private sector.
The unsaid part is a basic resentment at having the limited supply of seats in quality private schools - seen, quite simply, as among the sort of goodies you can buy with money, a class privilege - hived off to fill "welfare" quotas. When caste-based reservations in higher education created mass wrath among the more privileged castes two decades ago (and ever since), the argument always was that caste was an invalid category in a modern society - and only an economic criterion of deprivation would be acceptable. Now that one such comes along, naturally the logical warfare must move to a different trench.
But at the lawmaker's end, the biggest debate is about finances. The states and Delhi are yet to thrash out how exactly they will share the burden. The disquiet is understandable because the estimated cost of implementing the compulsory free education bill is said to be almost US$11.5 billion a year.
The Planning Commission had earlier expressed its inability to fork out that kind of money. Convinced that state governments may not have the wherewithal to implement the bill, economists and education evangelists are criticizing Delhi for putting out a blank check with nobody's signature on it.
The ruling Congress party, however, has its own political compulsions. It had promised compulsory free education to voters in its election manifesto. This bill sits well with the socialistic, "we-are-for-the-common-man" image being cultivated by the party, and has been rolled out in a hurry in keeping with the pacey mode of government suggested by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's 100-day work schedule. Human Resource Development Minister Kapil Sibal is thrilled to have been able to keep to the schedule. Law Minister Veerappa Moily had had to withdraw his bill on judicial reform at the introduction stage. The Right to Education bill had no such hiccups as it was supported by parties across the political spectrum.
The nagging doubts about its economic feasibility are not going to go away too soon, though. It was, in fact, by citing the "impossible" financial burden of such an enterprise that Mahatma Gandhi's dogged demand for making free school education a fundamental right was averted by the post-independence government. Even now, there is a lack of clarity on who will foot the bill, on whether the state will come forward.
This owes to the federal structure of education in India. Education is on the concurrent list and any sweeping, pan-India law on this front has to have the states totally on board for it to have any meaning. In many ways, India follows a federal structure of administration.
Sources in the Human Resource Development Ministry say in case the states refuse to share the burden, throwing up their hands in the name of fund shortages, the newly passed bill will be referred to the Finance Commission, which then will sort out the funding issue. If the states happen to show a positive mindset, the central government will replicate the pattern it follows for the present school enrollment scheme - the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (Education for All). It operates on a 70:30 ratio with Delhi picking up the hefty part of the bill.
"We as a nation cannot afford our children not going to schools," Sibal says, by way of trying to introduce a moral obligation to propel Delhi and the states in their task of providing free and compulsory education to children. Though he was initially accused of going too fast, his approach has rested on the persuasive appeal of structural-reformist elements. For instance, this bill also aims to stop the scourge of private tuition facilities, which are sustained by the highly competitive school board exams.
Funds are not the only issue. A day before the Upper House of parliament passed the bill, disability groups were up in arms, alleging that the draft deliberately excluded disabled children from its ambit. This, in effect, would mean that 30 million disabled children have no formal right to education.
Activists accused minister Kapil Sibal of engineering a u-turn from the United Progressive Alliance government's earlier policy on education for the disabled. They pointed out that Sibal's predecessor, Arjun Singh, had made a promise on the floor of the House, during the 14th Lok Sabha (the Lower House's previous term), that education would be universal across all groups.
Activists also accused Sibal of not being aware of the commitment made in the 11th five-year plan document. They even claimed that a specific clause that took care of the needs and rights of disabled children just disappeared from the bill after Sibal took over. Finally, the prime minister had to come out to mollify the aggrieved group with a special instruction to his human resources minister.
Despite these fundamental shortcomings, and whatever other teething trouble it is bound to encounter in a country as large as India, the bill does represent a historic and decisive turn from the past.
It promises to bring the light of education into the lives of millions of young boys and girls forced into laboring in small-scale hazardous industries, farmlands, households, hotels and the like to earn a living. Or, maybe merely crisscrossing the map with their migrant labor parents until they, too, get sucked up into the system.

Lashkar-e-Tayyeba network in Bangladesh

The recent arrest of two Lashkar-e-Tayyeba (LeT) operatives from Bangladesh, Maulana Mohammad Monsur Ali alias Maulana Habibullah and Mufti Sheikh Obaidullah, revealed the emergence of a trans-national network of jihadi groups aligned with criminal syndicates working to expand al Qaida’s south Asia reach into the Bay of Bengal and beyond. Besides LeT, the network has Harkat-ul Jihadi al Islami (HuJI), a terrorist group linked to the Afghan jihad and al Qaida, a little known Indian criminal-terrorist group. Asif Reza Commando Force (ARCF) and the D-Company, a trans-national criminal syndicate run by Dawood Ibrahim which has been facilitating funding, weapons purchase and logistic support for terrorist activities in India.

Investigations carried out by the Bangladesh security and intelligence agencies have so far revealed that LeT has been active in the country for over 14 years and has had support from some of the political leaders, including some ministers in the Bangladesh National Party (BNP)-Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) coalition government led by Khaleda Zia. Obaidullah and Ali had managed to establish LeT bases in Shibchar in Madaripur, Srinagar in Munshiganj and Nababganj in Dhaka. Ali is 16th in the list of 280 Afghan jihad veterans prepared by the US agencies.

LeT, a terrorist group set up by Osama bin Laden to carry forward al Qaida’s long-term strategic mission in Pakistan, has carried out spectacular attacks in India for more than a decade. Some of the most serious terror attacks in India, including the December 13, 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament, the July 2006 and November 2008 attacks in Mumbai had a clear LeT footprint. Besides, LeT has also been training cadres for fighting the NATO forces in Afghanistan for the past seven years. LeT has also been involved in several global terror attacks, for instance the London tube bombings of July 2005. The group’s linkages have been found in 21 countries so far.

In Bangladesh, LeT has been actively pursuing its anti-India terror campaign from the country for quite some time. One of the top LeT commanders, Abdul Karim alias Tunda, had been operating out of Bangladesh, collecting funds and weapons besides training men for terrorist attacks in India. Tunda, a resident of Hissar in Haryana, was one of the first LeT recruits in India to launch terrorist attacks in 1993 and had fled India after his teammate, Dr Jalees Ansari, was arrested. LeT Operational chief Zaki-ur Rahman Lakhvi, an Afghan jihad veteran and an al Qaida activist (His brother-in-law Abu Abdur Rahman Sareehi is a close associate of Osama bin Laden), handled Tunda and his team- mates. Lakhvi is currently on trial for the Mumbai attacks. LeT has been piggyback riding on Harkat-ul Jihad al Islami (HuJI), another al Qaida clone with bases in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh, and Asif Reza Commando Force (ARCF), a local ally in West Bengal which shifted its base across the border after its leader, Asif Raza Khan, was found to be a key fund raiser for the 9/11 attack. Both HuJI and ARCF had also carried the 2002 Kolkata American Centre attack.

During questioning, Obaidullah said he was in constant touch with Asif Reza in Pakistan with the help of mobile phones; he had six mobiles. Police officials said ARCF was a LeT proxy and operated in India, Bangladesh and Pakistan as a facilitating agency for terrorist groups. LeT, for instance, funded HuJI activities in Bangladesh with the help of ARCF. Obaidullah got a monthly salary of 7000 takas from LeT.

Both Habibullah and Obaidullah are key to the LeT network in Bangladesh. Both had come to Bangladesh in June 1995 and had trained in using weapons and explosives at HuJI training centres before leaving for Afghanistan. Habibullah, an Indian Railway employee, had gone to Pakistan in the early 80s after he was persuaded by some extremist leaders to take part in the Afghan jihad. He reportedly went back and forth between Pakistan and Afghanistan during the jihad days at least 25 times and was trained in guerrilla warfare and weapons by Army trainers at the Afghan camps. After the Soviet troops left Afghanistan, Habibullah left for India and began networking with likeminded people to launch jihad in India.

But soon, Habibullah came to the notice of the Indian security agencies and he escaped to Bangladesh in 1995. There he took up teaching at several madrasas and began setting up LeT network in Bangladesh. He was closely associated with HuJI leaders Mufti Abdul Hannan and Maulana Abdur Rauf. Mufti Hannan ran a terrorist training camp in Chittagong where many Indian terrorists trained, including Nalgonda resident Ghulam Yazdani and Mumbai resident Feroz Abdul Latif Ghaswala. Yazdani, prime accused in the assassination of Gujarat Deputy Chief Minister Haren Panda, was involved in recruiting several LeT cadres from Andhra Pradesh and other states and had a hand in several terrorist attacks in India. Ghaswala was one of the main accused in the 2005 July Mumbai serial train bombings.

Interestingly, both Habibullah and Obaidullah were arrested following the interrogation of two Dawood Ibrahim--D Company--associates, Zahid Sheikh and Daud Merchant. Sheikh is wanted in the murder of Indian music baron, Gulshan Kumar, in 1997. The D-Company and LeT alliance had been substantiated on several occasions in the past decade or so. In 2003, the US Treasury had proscribed Dawood for his links with al Qaida and LeT. Dawood and his men have also been funding and facilitating the LeT networks in Mumbai and other cities in India. Dawood’s nexus with LeT in Bangladesh has been not so well known till now. Sheikh and Merchant said there were over 150 paid D-Company agents in Bangladesh and an equal number aligned to the group. The D Company, the duo said, enjoyed the patronage of at least two former ministers, three lawmakers and seven businessmen.

LeT, in the recent times, has been under pressure to keep its terrorist activities low key in Pakistan. With groups like HuJI and its allies entrenched in some areas of Bangladesh, LeT has been making moves to establish an operating base from the eastern border of India. The group has been expanding its influence along the India-Bangladesh border for quite sometime by setting up Ahl-e-Hadis mosques, particularly in Murshidabad and Maldah districts of West Bengal. The attempts to widen its base in Bangladesh came into focus in the recent times when one of its operatives based in Nepal, Mohammad Omar Madani, was arrested in Delhi. Madani was coordinating with several terrorist and extremist outfits in Bangladesh to expand the terrorist group’s base. with inputs ASIA TIMES

Is Suu Kyi Guilty?

In the trial of Suu Kyi, which has been going on for the last three months, the verdict, which had been delayed more than once for various reasons is out. On 11 August 2009 Suu Kyi has been sentenced to18 months house arrest. The court had actually sentenced her to three years in prison with hard labour. By a special order from the Head of the State, read out by the Home Minister in the court, her sentence was reduced to 18 months and that it could be served under house arrest.
The verdict was on expected lines but the quantum of 18 months was significant as it covers till the end of 2010, by which time the multi party elections would be over. Hence the obvious fact is to keep her under house arrest till the elections are over and the new government is in position.
It was in July 1989 that she was first placed in house arrest. In the last two decades she has spent about 14 years under house arrest. She was to be released in May this year (2009). A few days before her expected release this incident of an American, John Yettaw, swimming across the lake and sneaking into her residence happened In this trial Yettaw has been sentenced to three years in prison for breaching Ms Suu Kyi’s house arrest, three years for an immigration offence and another one year term with hard labour for swimming in a restricted zone.
This incident proved a blessing in disguise for the military junta for charging her on violation of state security laws, breaching the terms of her house arrest and for permitting a foreigner to gain entry to her house. She was arrested and taken to Insein prison. She denied all the charges leveled against her and said that she accommodated the foreigner on humanitarian grounds. The trial lasted for 86 days till the verdict was announced on 11 August 2009.
When the military junta is in full control of the situation, the constitution framed to suit its requirements and the opposition in disarray, why should Suu Kyi be kept away from the scene?
During 1990 elections, she was under arrest and was not allowed to contest. Despite this, the opposition swept the polls on her name and her charisma.
In 2002, she was released unconditionally and allowed to move around the country freely. Her popularity was surging and thousands of people gathered to meet her wherever she travelled. The junta was surprised at the public response and support and had to resort to some extraneous means to attack her convoy in May 2003 and put her under house arrest.
Her party, National League for Democracy keeps raising the bogey of accepting the people’s verdict in the 1990 polls (both internally and internationally), which the military junta has annulled. It is keen to have the 2010 elections completed in their favour without any hurdles so that the 1990 verdict can become part of the country’s history. In this regard her being inaccessible to the party and the public will be crucial.
From the views expressed by the diplomats who were allowed inside the court on a few occasions during this trial, she was seen to be calm, brave, serene and gave no indications of remorse on her part or bitterness towards the prosecution. The general feeling was that she will still play a major role and influence the political future of this country.
The Junta is still scared of the charisma, popularity and influence that Suu Kyi (if released) can exert on the masses even after this long period of detention and house arrest.
The Constitution has a specific clause which reads “The President of the Union himself, parents, spouse, children and their spouses shall not owe allegiance to a foreign power, shall not be subject of a foreign power or citizen of a foreign country. They shall not be persons entitled to the rights and privileges of a subject or citizen of a foreign country”. This is to preclude her from a political comeback even if she is free without amending the constitution as she was married to Michael Aris, an Englishman and a Tibetan scholar. He died in March 1999. She did not even go for his funeral to England, fearing that she would never be allowed to return..
There has been wide spread condemnation of this verdict from the international community. UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown said that it was “a purely political sentence”. The French President called upon the European Union to impose new sanctions. The EU presidency said it would impose “additional targeted measures against those responsible for the verdict”.
The military junta must be fully aware of the likely reactions on this verdict from the international community. With public memory being short lived, the pressure will ease as time passes and as long as China and Russia are on their side it can weather any storm raised in the international arena.
The military junta may also release some inconsequential political prisoners (out of the 2100 odd) in the near future, as indicated by the country’s ambassador to the UN, to placate the international community and to reduce the pressure.
Thus the military leadership will adhere to its road map to democracy, stage the multi party elections in 2010 and prop up a civilian government (without the NLD and Suu Kyi), that will be subservient to the junta’s interests. Than Shwe and the other senior generals can retire peacefully and be free from fear of any retribution and at the same time keep the military in a dominant position in the state for some years to come.

Mixed Signals from China to India

The 13th round of the talks between the Special Representatives of India and China on the long-pending border dispute was held at New Delhi on August 7 and 8, 2009. India was represented by M. K. Narayanan, the National Security Adviser, and China by Dai Bingguio, the State Councillor. It was reported that in addition to the border dispute, which was the principal subject of the discussions, they also discussed other matters of strategic importance.
According to the briefing given to the Indian media by Indian officials, the discussions on other matters of strategic importance resulted in the following agreements:
To set up a hotline between the Prime Ministers of the two countries as a confidence-building measure. India presently has a hotline only with Russia. It has been reported that the suggestion for a hotline between the Prime Ministers of India and China originally came from President Hu Jintao when he had met Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in the margins of the summit of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO) at Yekaterinburg in Russia on June 15,2009.
To keep up the momentum in the expansion of the bilateral trade, which reached US $ 52 billion last year.
To celebrate the 60 th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in a befitting manner next year.
The focus in the media briefings on the positive decisions in respect of other matters of strategic importance and not on the border dispute possibly indicated that the deadlock in finding a mutually acceptable solution to the border dispute remained unbroken in the talks. It is noticed that the Government/party controlled Chinese media gave more details of the talks than the Indian media. The text of identical reports carried by the "People's Daily" and the "China Daily" is annexed.
It may be recalled that earlier this year the " Global Times", an English language daily of the "People's Daily" group, and a section of Chinese academics had mounted a critical and sarcastic campaign against India following media reports of reported Indian plans to deploy two Mountain Divisions and an Air Force Squadron in Arunachal Pradesh for its defence.rg/papers33/paper3260.html .
This media campaign against India----- unusual in its sarcasm and ridicule of Indian aspirations of becoming a global power--- had a strongly negative impact on large sections of Indian public opinion and added to the existing prejudices against China. Possibly realising this, an attempt was made by the "People's Daily" on the eve of the border talks to project India in a positive light by the publication of some articles, which gave the impression of being more objective and appreciative of India. One of these articles, which was widely noticed in India, was contributed by Zhang Yan, who assumed charge as the Chinese Ambassador to India in March last year.
In a special interview to the Xinhua news agency on the eve of the border talks, which was disseminated on August 4, 2009, he said: "China and India should settle the existing border disputes properly, calling into play the greatest possible political wisdom. Despite the twists and turns in China-India ties and border disputes, the two countries share the same historical responsibilities of developing economies, improving people's lives and safeguarding world peace and development, which requires them to properly handle existing problems with the utmost political wisdom. The two countries are facing valuable development opportunities. They should use the 60th anniversary of diplomatic ties between the two countries next year to cement bilateral links and contribute to Asia's and world peace and development. The two largest Asian countries have witnessed rapid growth in their relationship in recent years and forged a strategic cooperative partnership. There were frequent visits between top leaders and increasing parliamentary, youth and military exchanges. China is now India's top trading partner, while India has become China's largest overseas project contracting market and an important investment destination. Bilateral trade volume between the two hit 51.7 billion U.S. dollars in 2008, up 35 per cent over the same period of a year ago. The two countries have also set a target of bilateral trade volume of 60 billion U.S. dollars by 2010. The two countries share the same stance on major international and regional issues, and had maintained close cooperation on hot topics such as climate change, food security, Doha negotiations and the worldwide economic downturn. As emerging powers, China and India have worked closely within the frameworks of BRIC, the five developing nations and the Group of 20, to safeguard the common interests of developing countries."
It is learnt that the Chinese visual media also projected a more positive image of India. While I have not had an opportunity of watching the Chinese TV, a member of the web site www.bharat-rakshak.com, who had, has posted as follows: "Newstory in Chinese CCTV on India as a global player. The story was spurred by the launch of Arihant (the nuclear submarine). Mostly accurate and probably the most accurate coming from a foreign source. The Chinese analyst clearly talks about India's arrival on the Asian and the world scene. More sober than the scathing diatribes from Global Times in the recent past. They talk about India being one of the four ancient civilizations. Never seen that from CNN types."
While thus projecting India and the Sino-India relations in a positive light on the eve of the border talks, the English language Chinese media, at the same time, sought to convey a message that this positive portrayal did not presage any change in China's stand on the border dispute, which remained and which would remain as before. Under the title "Expert: China will not compromise on Sino-Indian border issue", the " Global Times" reported as follows on August 7,2009, the day the latest round of border talks started: "Border talks between China and India began today in New Delhi, capital of India, according to the Global Times. This round of negotiations followed media speculation, with Reuters saying the two countries are not likely to reach a border treaty, while Hongkong media claimed the negotiations are making great progress. Ming Pao, a Hongkong newspaper, suggested that the present time is not favorable for China to resolve boundary issue in such a hurried way because the country is still rising globally and if the dispute is not properly addressed, the result will only be blamed by generations to come. Chinese military expert Long Tao commented that the disputed region of South Tibet is not the cause of the two countries' conflict in the history, but rather was left over from 1914. That was when the British colonialists arbitrarily made the "McMahon Line," which Long says is even more ridiculous than the unequal Treaty of Nanjing. He also added that though the two parties want to focus on developing bilateral ties, China won't sacrifice its sovereignty in exchange for friendship. Therefore, India should not have any illusions with regard to this issue."
The Xinhua news agency disseminated a report the same day quoting Jiang Yu, a spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, as saying as follows: " China is willing to make joint efforts with India in the spirit of mutual understanding and accommodation to seek a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution to the issue. China and India have disputed territory along the Himalayan region in southwest China's Tibet Autonomous Region as a result of the "McMahon Line" drawn by the British colonial rulers in India in the early 20th century. However, the Chinese Government has never recognized the illegal "McMahon Line". "
The message, which was conveyed through the Chinese media in the days before the border talks and on the first day of the border talks, was thus very clear: China continued to attach importance to a further improvement of its bilateral relations with India, but it will remain firm on its claims to Indian territory in the Arunachal Pradesh sector.

THE ROLE OF INDIAN MEDIA IN PROXY WAR AND TERRORISM

INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS

The Indian media prides itself in galvanizing the nation in times of war with Pakistan and China with their print reportage and visual coverage. However, when it comes to covering Pakistan’s Proxy War and Terrorism against India, the record of the Indian media is not all that promising and creditable.

This criticism applies more to the Indian TV media and less to the Indian print media. The Indian print media has the advantage of time in order to present a relatively more balanced reportage, which crystallizes in the time span between terrorist incidents and their reportage in print.

The Indian TV media laboring under the pressure of 24X7 competitive live coverage of terrorist incidents, absence of instant availability of Government releases and briefings on terrorism incidents and the prevailing confusion and fog on the developing situation tend to indulge in speculative reporting.

In the above process, national security considerations are lost and the Indian TV media ends up as an unwilling tool of exploitation of the Pakistani terrorist organizations disinformation strategies.

The Indian media, both print and TV, seem to be confused when it comes to covering Pakistan’s Proxy War and Terrorism against India. This confusion becomes further confounded as the Indian media wrestles with itself as to what should be “The Role of the Indian Media in Proxy War and Terrorism”. Should it be “The Role of the Indian Media in Proxy War and Terrorism” or should the role of the Indian media be “The Role of the Indian Media Against Proxy War and Terrorism.”

Since India is being subjected to Proxy War and Terrorism by Pakistan for well over 20 years now, the Indian media should rightfully perceive its role as “The Role of the Indian Media Against Pakistan’s Proxy War and Terrorism Against India.

The Indian media would additionally be able to add more clarity and objectivity to its reportage and visual coverage when it recognizes the ground reality that Pakistan’s Proxy War and Terrorism against India is a state-sponsored product of the Pakistani Government, the Pakistan Army and its intelligence agencies and their surrogate Jihadi terrorist organizations adding the Islamic tinge.

Targeting these above Pakistani entities, the Indian media in its print and TV coverage would not only be serving India’s national security interests but also be assisting the cause of democracy aspirations of the Pakistani people.

The Indian media also needs to dispel from its mind that in espousing a vacillating Indian Governments “soft approaches” in its counter- terrorism approaches, war hysteria and jingoism is being generated.

In the coverage of Pakistan’s Proxy War and Terrorism against India the two major failings of the India media, can be recounted as under:

Not adding “Context to Pakistan’s Proxy War and Terrorism Against India"
Failing to “Frame Pakistan’s Proxy War and Terrorist Incidents in their Correct Perspective.
My presentation today would attempt to address these two major issues besides some others generally on the role of media in proxy war and terrorism.

The issues that would be covered by me today are:

The Constitution of India, Press Freedom and National Security
Pakistan’s Proxy War and Terrorism: The “Context” that Indian Media should Add in its Reportage
Pakistan’s Proxy War and Terrorism: “Framing” Pakistan’s Terrorism in the Correct Perspectives
Proxy War and Terrorism: Comparative analysis of Terrorists Exploitation of Media and India’s Expectations from the Indian Media
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRESS FREEDOM AND NATIONAL SECURITY

The Constitution of India, surprisingly, does not mention “freedom of the Press” specifically in the Chapter on Fundamental Rights. Dr. Ambedkar however clarified later that it was not necessary to stipulate it specifically as it is implicit in the guarantees of Freedom of Speech and Expression in Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution.

Notably, censorship is not covered in any provisions of the Indian Constitution.

However under the Constitution, during an emergency, Fundamental Rights including Freedom of Expression and Speech stand suspended. In Article 19 (2) of the Constitution of India, the freedom of the Press can be restricted for reasons of sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the state and preserving democracy, besides some other contingencies.

Having said that, I would like to stress to the Indian media in their role while covering Proxy War and Terrorism that:

With freedom of Press, comes responsibility and accountability
In a Proxy War and Terrorism environment National Security imperatives and requirements should override any misguided journalistic impulses for scoops and sensation.
Proxy War and Terrorism participants indulge in acts of war against the Indian State and its Constitution. Such individuals cannot seek refuge in the Indian Constitution for Human Rights protection and legal processes guaranteed by the Indian Constitution.
In light of the above, in Proxy War and Terrorism situations, the Indian media is expected to exercise a large degree of self-restraint.

PAKISTAN’S PROXY WAR AND TERRORISM: THE “CONTEXT” THAT INDIAN MEDIA SHOULD ADD IN ITS REPORTAGE

India’s embattled security environment, both in terms of external security and internal security results from the decades of proxy war and terrorism that Pakistan has launched against it.

Proxy war and Terrorism have emerged as the state instruments of Pakistan and the main policy tools of the Pakistan Army in its asymmetric warfare against India. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal has additionally emboldened it to employ Proxy war and Terrorism more boldly against India.

Frustrated that Pakistan’s policy of bleeding India with a “thousand cuts” had not been successful, Pakistan’s Terrorism Warfare is no longer confined to Jammu and Kashmir, but now encompasses the main heartland of India from Guwahati to Mumbai and from Delhi to Bangalore.

India as a whole is now in the cross-hairs of Pakistan’s perfidious Proxy War and Terrorism. Unlike the India-Pakistan wars of the past, Pakistan’s Terrorism War against India is no longer confined to Western border-states. Every Indian state is now a battlefield for Pakistan’s Terrorism War.

India and its citizens across the board must become alive to this dangerous reality.

Mumbai 9/11, and this term is deliberately used by me as opposed to 26/11, should have become a defining moment for India’s combating Pakistan’s Terrorism War, like 9/11 was for the United States.

Mumbai 9/11 was Pakistan’s open declaration of war against India, when a handful of Pakistani terrorists trained by Pakistan’s Special Forces Group held the majesty of the Indian State to ransom for three days in the full glare of national and international media.

The United States response to 9/11 was the US military intervention in Afghanistan to destroy the Al Qaeda and Taliban terrorist infrastructure there. India’s response has been appeasement of Pakistan.

India’s democratic traditions and liberal institutions have however not instilled in the Indian political leadership, unlike other democracies the will to use power to liquidate threats to India’s security. It is this national weakness of India that emboldens Pakistan’s incessant Proxy War and Terrorism against India. This contextual weakness needs to be highlighted incessantly by the Indian media.

India’s embattled security environment and the failure or reluctance to come to grips with Pakistan’s Proxy War and Terrorism places an Indian national call on the Indian media to review and redefine its role in covering and combating Pakistan’s Proxy War and Terrorism against India. It is this context that the Indian media needs to keep uppermost in its mind while covering Pakistan’s terrorism.

The Indian media, despite many short comings, is assessed by me, as a strong and valuable “pillar of state of the Indian Republic. Its scrutiny and oversight of India’s political leadership and policy has been an effective “check and balance” to ensure that India’s democracy is not endangered.

Imbued with the same spirit, the Indian media, both print and visual, should now look upon themselves as one more weapon of the Indian Republic in combating Pakistan’s Proxy War and Terrorism which endangers India’s national security.

While the Indian Army battles the Pakistan menace with their weapons, the Indian media should battle Pakistan’s Proxy War and Terrorism with the power of their pens and the impact of TV visuals.

PAKISTAN’S PROXY WAR AND TERRORISM “FRAMING” PAKISTAN’S TERRORISM IN THE CORRECT PERSPECTIVE

The role of the Indian media in covering the four major India-Pakistan Wars has been good. With each successive war there was a qualitative improvement in Indian Media’s performance.

The Kargil War of 1999 was for the first time in India covered extensively by the TV visual media and created impact on the Indian public mind considerably.

However, in the coverage of Proxy War and Terrorism which has abounded more frequently since 2004, there is much to be desired from the Indian media in terms of their coverage and the desired impact that they should have normally been expected to create.

Very briefly, the Indian TV media during the last five years seemed to err less on the side of national security imperatives and more erring towards “humanizing” the terrorists, their cause and in J & K falling prey to the disinformation propaganda campaign of the pro-Pakistan separatists against India.

Possibly, this arises from the Indian media’s lack of grasp of the main and true intents of Pakistan’s Proxy War and Terrorism against India. Unless this is understood and recognized by the Indian media, and especially the visual media, they would be handicapped in playing an effective role in the coverage of Pakistan’s Proxy War and Terrorism.

Pakistan’s Proxy War and Terrorism against Indian needs to be framed by the Indian media in the following perspectives:

Pakistan’s Proxy War and Terrorism is no longer confined to Jammu & Kashmir aimed at the secession of the State from India.
Pakistan’s Proxy War and Terrorism against India is no longer militancy or terrorist activities, or insurgency arising from indigenous root causes.
Pakistan’s Proxy War and Terrorism against India is a full-fledged “War Against India” by applying all the instruments of asymmetric warfare against India by a combined and coordinated use of militancy, terrorism, insurgency and possibly tomorrow use of nuclear terrorism.
Pakistan’s Proxy War and Terrorism is no longer targeted at Indian security forces. Today, it targets the Indian Republic as a whole. It targets innocent civilian population and India’s economic, financial, scientific and other strengths including its social fabric.
The root causes of Pakistan’s Proxy War and Terrorism against India, and which transcend any other root causes, is Pakistan’s unrelenting hostility towards India. India is Pakistan’s “Enemy No.1”. Pakistan could not cut down India to size in four wars. It now intends to down-size India strategically by asymmetric warfare which is akin to unleashing termites to eat into the very entrails of the Indian Republic.
The Indian media therefore has to breakout of the fixation that media coverage needs to be confined or viewed through the myopic lens of militancy and terrorism as some law and order problem. Further, that while covering these Pakistan threats, root causes have to be discerned and highlighted. Root causes should be explored by the Indian media in their political coverage and not of proxy war and terrorism.

India’s political leadership and its polity have not been able to rise up to meet this Pakistan challenge. Their political will to use power is conspicuously missing.

India’s flawed counter-terrorism approaches in neutralizing the Pakistani threat to India arises from the following causes and the Indian media should frame these perspectives in their reportage:

India’s divided polity which politicizes both national security and terrorism challenges.
Minority vote bank politics of the ruling party and its allies, leading to scrapping to anti-terrorism laws.
India’s judicial system which has not been restructured for speedy and summary trials and punishment of those who wage war against the Indian Republic.
The Indian media’s role in Pakistan’s Proxy War and Terrorism therefore does not arise only as a “Force Multiplier” of the Indian Army and police organizations as they battle Pakistan’s continuing and incessant threats against India. More importantly Indian media’s role in Proxy War and Terrorism extends to fire “Tear Gas” at India’s political leaders so that they blink their eyes and see through the realities of Pakistan’s Proxy War and Terrorism – stop them form politicizing such threats and prod them into effective counter-measures.

PROXY WAR AND TERRORISM: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TERRORISTS EXPLOITATION OF MEDIA AND INDIA'S EXPECTATIONS FROM THE MEDIA

At the outset of the analysis, one would like to quote excerpts from a US Congressional Report dealing with this subject, as they encapsulate the essence of the problems at issue, and these are:

“Terrorists, governments and the media see the functions, roles and responsibilities of the media covering terrorist events from differing and opposing perspectives.”
“Such perceptions drive respective behavior during terrorist incidents- often resulting in tactical and strategic gains or losses, to the terrorist operations and the overall terrorist cause.”
“The challenge to the Government and the press community is to understand the dynamics of terrorist enterprise and develop policy options to serve government, media and societal interests.”
The intents and dynamics of Pakistan’s Proxy War and terrorism against India stand amplified for the Indian media in the preceding discussion.

However, before the comparative analysis, one would like to quote some excerpts of studies made on the subject. These are from various sources and revealing in their content.

“Mainstream media shies away from the main actors in Terrorism and Proxy War- the victims of terrorism and the security forces who have to combat the invisible enemy targeting innocent civilians. Media needs to move beyond spin, ask questions because we don’t have all the answers and evaluate what we are told.”
“We must wake up to the harsh reality of the fact that low-intensity conflict or Proxy War has been unleashed against us by way of information aggression. Forces hostile to India have tended to occupy the vacuum created by the inadequate reach of Indian media.”
“Terrorists alter the uneven balance of power through the media metaphor which amplifies their horrific acts and demands with the publicity terrorists would never buy or afford.”
“What democracies cannot afford is to let the freedom of the Press continue to serve the forces that seek to undermine them.”
“It is an inexorable, if abhorrent axiom, that violent acts like terrorism increase print media readership and TV ratings thus terrorists and journalists are involved in an intricate. Symbiotic dance that professionally benefits both, despite protestations to the contrary.”
“Like it not, the media is still an integral, unfortunate and unavoidable part of achieving the terrorists aims and therefore be as judicious and responsible as possible in reporting.”
These excerpts make the follow-up task of comparative analysis that much simpler.

Media Exploitation By The Terrorists

The terrorist commit violent act looking to gain three universal objectives which they assess the media coverage facilitates. These are (1) Capture national and international attention (2) Gain recognition of their cause, and (3) Gaining recognition, the terrorists hope that with the attendant media publicity, some degree of legitimacy would accrue.

Media exploitation by the terrorists focus on the following expectations (1) Media will provide publicity of their deeds and cause (2) In the process, media coverage would facilitate spread of fear and amplify panic (3) Show up the impotence of the Government and security forces to combat Proxy War and Terrorism (4) Exploit media as a tool for their coordinated and calibrated disinformation strategies.

In case of the Indian media, Pakistan’s intelligence agencies and their Proxy War and Terrorism surrogates exploit the liberalist impulses and spin approaches for Human Right violations by engineering situations in which security forces would be forced to act firmly.

Proxy War and terrorism in India thrives on the “oxygen of publicity” provided by the Indian media.

Indian Media’s Role in Proxy War and Terrorism: The National Expectations

Combating Proxy War and terrorism is a challenging task for the security forces of the Indian Republic. The enemy is invisible, Pakistan has local sleeper cells and modules within India and the Indian security forces have to battle this menace with one hand tied politically.

In such an environment, the Indian media needs to exhibit “UNDERSTANDING, RESTRAINT, COOPERATION AND LOYALTY” and by thus doing act as a “Force Multiplier” for India's security forces. The Indian media should guard against becoming an unwitting “force Multiplier” for Pakistani Proxy War and Terrorism machine.

More specifically, the Indian media’s expected role should be to (1) Deny the terrorists a media platform for publicity (2) Avoid glamorizing terrorists and terrorism incidents (3) Project terrorists as “war criminals” and their terrorist act as Acts of War against India (4) Prevent use of media as a disinformation tool of terrorists strategy (5) Media should boost the morale of the security forces and so also their public image (6) Media should restrain themselves form building pressures on the Government and security forces for instant action or pressures to yield-in to terrorists demands especially in hostage situations

Time does not permit derailed case studies of Indian media’s role in coverage of the Proxy War and Terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir or Mumbai 9/11. However the analysis briefly outlined above would enable the Indian media to redefine its role in Proxy War and Terrorism that Pakistan continues to indulge against India.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Pakistan’s Proxy War and Terrorism is not a passing phenomenon. These will continue as Pakistan’s instruments of state policy against India fuelled by Pakistan’s obsessive fixation of down-sizing India.

Peace dialogues and Confidence Building Measures are political expedients for both sides. These cannot emerge as India's weapons to neutralize or lessen Pakistan’s Proxy War and Terrorism against India.

In the absence of visionary Indian political leadership imbued with strategic vision and conditioned in ‘strategic culture’ mindsets, to combat purposefully Pakistan’s Proxy War and Terrorism Against India, the mantle falls on the Indian media to “Add Context” to Pakistan’s perfidious repeated terrorist attacks on India and so also to “Frame Pakistan’s Terrorist Attack Against India in the Correct Perspectives”. By doing so the Indian media could assist in galvanizing the Indian people to vociferously demand strong counter-terrorism policies against Pakistan’s calibrated and coordinated Proxy War and Terrorism against India.